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C hemical control methods against
illicit drug crops in producer coun-
tries have longbeen a fixture ofthe
20-year U.S. war on drugs. In 1998,
President Bill Clinton unveiled *an
unprecedented $16 billion antidrug initia-
tive that induded a generous allotment for
applying herbicides to crops in drug-pro-
ducing nations. The U.S. initiative follows
protocols outlined in the 1988 United
Nations (UN) Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances. The UN accepts herbi-
cidal crop eradication programs as part of
the fight against the $60 billion global
trade in drugs such as heroin and cocaine,
which are abused by 8 million and 13 mil-
lion people respectivelyworldwide, accord-
ing to data collected by the UN
International Drug Control Programme.
But the issue at hand seems to be a ques-
tion ofwhich is the worse of two evils-
the effects of drug crop cultivation and
production or those of chemical eradica-
tion ofsuch crops.
Drug use is clearly costly to societies
and individuals. The White House Office
on Drug Policy estimates that 13 million
people in the United States use illegal
drugs. In 1992, drug use cost the U.S.
medical system $98 billion, resulted in $14
billion in lost productivity, and led to
$59.1 billion in judicial costs, including
costs of litigation and incarceration,
according to The Economic Costs ofAlcohol
and DrugAbuse in the United States-
1992, a report bythe National Institute on
Drug Abuse and the National Institute on
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. This
report states that approximately 36% of
AIDS cases reported to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention in 1992
were related to intravenous drug use-a
phenomenon mirrored in global figures on
theAIDS pandemic.
The drug trade has also led to local
drug abuse in producer countries. In the
mid-1980s, studies by M. Morales-Vaca
and F. Raul Jeri, published in the
April-June 1984 issue of the Bulletin on
Narcotics, noted that addiction to coca
paste (an intermediary product in the
extraction of the cocaine alkaloid) was
occurrmg in epidemic proportions, particu-
larly in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. These
problems have continued into the 1990s,
thoughtheyhave notbeenquantified.
Drug production is also environmen-
tally cosdy. In producer countries, crops of
coca, opium poppy, and marijuana have
replaced native vegetation in an area cover-
ing over 1 million hectares (ha), often in
protected areas such as species-rich rain
forests and erosion-prone cloud forests.
Additional environmental damage ensues
from the cultivation and processing of
these crops, which involve largevolumes of
pesticides, fertilizers, and toxic processing
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chemicals, generally dumped into rivers by
farmers or washed into them by heavy
rainfall. In a paper presented at the New
York Botanical Garden's June 1993 sym-
posium, Biodiversity and Conservation of
Neotropical Montane Forests, Jaime
Cavelier of the Department of Biological
Sciences at the Universidad de los Andes
and Andres Etter of the Institute of
Environmental Studies at the Universidad
Javeriana (both in Bogota, Colombia)
wrote that at the end of 1992, almost
20,000 ha of primary montane rain forest
in the Colombian Andes, mostly located in
and around the Nevado del Huila National
Park, had been deforested to make way for
illegal plots of opium poppies. Cavelier
and Etter warned that if these plantations
are not controlled soon, most of
Colombia's remaining montane forests will
disappear "well before the end of the cen-
tury." Proponents of chemical eradication
claim that damage on this order justifies
herbicidal eradication ofdrug crops.
Yet environmentalists and citizens'
groups in the United States and producer
countries increasingly claim that eradica-
tion efforts also cause large-scale harm to
human and environmental health.
Unfortunately, scientists have been unable
to quantify such damage because of the
violence surrounding drug production.
The harm to both human and environ-
mental health remains a disturbing ques-
tion whose answer is tied up in the funda-
mental problems that underlie the global
drug crisis: the political violence, poverty,
and infrastructural weakness in the remote
production zones that make illicit crops
more profitable than legitimate agriculture.
Drug Crop Cultivation and
Environmental Health
According to the U.S. State Department,
whose Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs plans and
implements U.S. drug policy overseas,
about 200,000 ha of opium poppies were
cultivated in 1996-potentially yielding
373 metric tons (MT) of heroin-mostly
in Burma, Laos, and Afghanistan, and
increasingly in western Mexico and in the
Andean foothills of western Colombia.
Cultivation ofover 209,700 ha ofcoca was
concentrated in Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia, potentially yielding 760 MT of
cocaine. Together, opium poppy and coca
cultivation cover an area about halfthe size
of Puerto Rico. The UN International
Drug Control Programme estimates that
wild or cultivated marijuana may cover
670,000-1,800,000 ha worldwide. U.S.
efforts chiefly target marijuana crops in
Colombia and Mexico, which are mainly
sold in the United States; the size of the
U.S. marijuana crop is unknown.
Licit cultivation ofopium poppies and
coca for use in pharmaceuticals or flavor-
ing can take place without necessarily
causing environmental harm. But the
emphasis on high volume in illicit drug
crop cultivation and processing is tremen-
dously damaging. Typically, illicit crop
plots replace native vegetation on govern-
ment-owned lands. Often, these areas have
been set aside to protect valuable natural
resources, but such protection is unreliable
because the parklands are frequently very
remote, transportation is difficult, and
land tenure laws are inadequate. At the
height of coca cultivation in Peru in the
late 1980s, for example, an estimated
200,000 ha ofbiologically rich high jungle
were slashed and burned to make way for
coca crops, with cultivation concentrated
in the Huallaga Valley at the western edge
of the Amazon Basin. Clear-cutting left
the steep, rainwashed slopes vulnerable to
erosion, which also washed heavily applied
fertilizers and pesticides into the rivers
that crisscross the region. But security
issues in areas where drug crops are culti-
vated make assessment of environmental
damage very difficult, and virtually no
substantive information quantifying this
damage is available.
Chemical contamination and the
resulting environmental health effects flow
downstream when raw crops are processed.
Coca processing, for example, involves pre-
cipitating out the cocaine alkaloid using a
series of baths in sulfuric acid, kerosene,
quicklime, carbides, acetone, and toluene.
Chemical residues are dumped into local
streams and rivers with environmental con-
sequences that include reduction of dis-
solved oxygen, increased pH, and toxicity
to aquatic fauna and flora. In a 1987 paper
published in the Peruvian journal Medio
Ambiente, Buenaventura Marcelo, a profes-
sor at Peru's Universidad Nacional
Agragria La Molina, estimated that, based
on total coca cultivation in Peru, 57 mil-
lion L ofkerosene, 32 million L ofsulfuric
acid, 16,000 MT oflime, and 6.4 million
L of acetone and toluene entered the
streams and rivers ofthe Peruvian Amazon
in 1986. Marcelo also noted the disappear-
ance of endemic aquatic animals and
plants in some streams, and that portions
of the Huallaga River in the coca-growing
areas were reported to be biologically dead.
Similar ecological disturbance has been
noted in the coca fields of southern
Colombia and in the opium and marijuana
fields of Mexico's ecologically rich Sierra
Madre region, according to case studies in
the Trade and Environment Database, a
compilation ofcase studies concerned with
trade and environment issues located on
the Internet at http://gurukul.ucc.ameri-
can.edu/ted/ted.htm. However, scientists
have been unable to do more than estimate
the human and environmental damage
caused by drug production in Peru and
other drug-producing countries because of
social factors in these countries, primarily
political violence. At the height of
Peruvian coca production in the late
1980s, the coca zones were controlled by
the terrorist group Shining Path. Shining
Path taxed coca operations in the Peruvian
Amazon to finance a destructive and
bloody revolution throughout Peru that
left 25,000 people dead. Political extremist
groups similarly hold sway in other drug-
producing regions, including the Wa eth-
nic group in Burma's Shan State (a group
that is now also diversifying into metham-
phetamine production), the Taliban fac-
tion in Afghanistan, and a variety of
groups in Colombia including the
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, a
left-wing guerilla group, and right-wing
paramilitary organizations. The presence of
such groups makes it impossible to docu-
ment the effects ofillicit drug production.
In drug-producing countries, political
violence tends to feed on other social fac-
tors, such as a lack of infrastructure and
poverty. In the rural areas of Asia and
Latin America, about 700,000 families, or
around 4 million people, depend on
income derived from the cultivation of
coca leaf and opium poppies. Most of
them live below the poverty level and rely
on this activity for some 50% of their
income, according to UN data. In Peru,
for example, illegal coca can earn three or
more times the price oflegal produce, and
is transported by small aircraft across the
Peruvian Amazon, bypassing the poorly
maintained roads that make transport of
legal commerce so unreliable.
Herbicides: AHealthySolution?
U.S. support for aerial eradication of illicit
drug crops began in the 1970s during the
Nixon administration, and accelerated in
the 1980s. Over the years, the United
States has worked with Panama, Belize,
Venezuela, Guatemala, and now Colombia
on joint aerial eradication programs, apply-
ing a liquid form of the broad-spectrum
herbicide glyphosate to illicit crops,
according to reports in the Washington Post.
According to the EPA, glyphosate has a
"relatively low oral/dermal toxicity." But
citizens' rights groups have expressed con-
cern about possible human health effects
from the aerial spraying. "There have been
reports of skin and bronchial effects," says
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Colombia specialist Winifred Tate, a fel-
low at the Washington Office on Latin
America (WOLA), a nonprofit advocacy
and policy organization. "But there's only
anecdotal evidence, and the environment
[itself] is not conducive to human health.
The cultivation takes place in lowland jun-
gle that has not traditionally been a place
of human habitation; people tend to get a
lot of problems like skin infections. Also,
they don't have access to health care and
potable water."
In the late 1970s, Mexico used equip-
ment and training supplied by the United
States in an aerial eradication program
using paraquat provided by the Mexican
government. Paraquat is a highly toxic her-
bicide that affects the lungs, liver, kidneys,
and cornea. It has caused many human
deaths, some ofwhich were reported in the
March-April 1993 issue of Archives of
Environmental Health in an article describ-
ing 16 deaths from paraquat poisoning in
Chiapas, Mexico, between 1988 and 1990.
An outcry arose in the United States in
the late 1970s when law enforcement offi-
cials found paraquat-contaminated mari-
juana in five U.S. cities. Since then,
paraquat has been banned for sale in the
United States and other countries, but it is
still manufactured and used globally. In
Mexico, it is still used for agriculture and
for limited aerial eradication of illicit drug
cultivation in remote areas, chiefly in unoc-
cupied lands of the western Sierra Madre,
where 4,000 ha ofpoppies and 5,000 ha of
marijuana have been eradicated using the
herbicide in accordance with UN guide-
lines, according to the Mexican Attorney
General's Office. The United States does
not fund the Mexican eradication program.
So far, none ofthe literature on the her-
bicides considered for U.S. programs
(including glyphosate, tebuthiuron, and
hexazinone) provides evidence of human
health effects from pesticide spraying
through presence in soil, water, or leaves.
Though the paraquat reputedly still used in
Mexico is known to be a factor in pesticide-
related poisonings, reports have not speci-
fied poisonings as a result of exposures
through eradication programs. In July
1998, WOLA recommended in a U.S. con~
gressional briefing on coca eradication
efforts in Colombia that a credible environ-
mental organization or university be con-
tracted to conduct thorough, independent
studies of the health and environmental
impact of aerial application of chemical
herbicides in the quantities used and under
the conditions faced in Colombia. As a
result of WOLA's recommendations and
those of other human rights and environ-
mental groups, the Congressional Foreign
Appropriations Committee recommended
that Congress fund such a study, though no
specific measures have been taken yet.
Chemical eradication programs have
had mixed effects in controlling illicit
crops. Efforts are hampered by such factors
as growers replanting fields after eradica-
tion, the need to revisit the site (sometimes
multiple times during a growing season),
incomplete destruction ofcultivations, fail-
ure of herbicides, and problems of quality
control, according to the U.S. State
Department's 1997 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report. In the coca zones
of southern Colombia, glyphosate has
eradicated only 30% ofcrops since applica-
tion began in late 1993, and coca cultiva-
tion has actually expanded from 37,100 ha
in 1992 to 67,200 ha in 1996, according
to the report, with growers pushing south-
eastward into the Amazon Basin. Opium
production in western Colombia has
shrunk only slightly, despite glyphosate
spraying.
Security concerns, as well as the mixed
performance of glyphosate, prompted a
push to use tebuthiuron as an adjunct to
glyphosate in Colombia. This past June,
under intense pressure from the United
States government, the Colombian govern-
ment agreed to test a pellet form of
tebuthiuron to destroy coca and opium
poppy crops. In the rebel-controlled grow-
ing zones, the pellet form allows spraying
from higher altitudes, offering pilots
greater protection from gunfire (according
to the 1997 International Narcotics Control
Strategyv Report, 51 aircraft were hit by hos-
tile fire in 1997 while "involved in or sup-
porting spray operations" in Colombia).
The pellet-form tebuthiuron is also more
resistant to being washed away by rain
because the pellets are soil-applied, unlike
glyphosate, which adheres to coca leaves
but may be washed off by rainfall before
enough of the chemical has penetrated to
kill the plant. By September, the testing
initiative had stalled, hampered by public
refusal by the chemical's U.S. manufactur-
er, Dow AgroSciences, to sell the herbicide
for use in Colombia. Dow says the chemi-
cal can damage aquatic organisms and is
not suited for application in hilly, rainy
areas, or when other, desirable plants are
present. All ofColombia's illicit crop zones
are rainy, and the opium-producing
regions are extremely steep. However,
Charles S. Helling, lead soil scientist at the
Weed Science Laboratory of the United
States Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Research Service, says that
Dow's argument is not appropriate because
the service has not recommended tebuthi-
uron for use against poppy plants.
U.S. groups including the Sierra Club,
the World Wildlife Fund, and Greenpeace
have raised concerns about the potential,
though unsubstantiated, health and envi-
ronmental effects ofaerial drug crop eradi-
cation. These groups, along with Latin
American citizens' organizations and the
Colombian minister of the environment,
claim that tebuthiuron poses dangers to
the environment due to its high potential
for leaching and its long half-life (the time
in which half of the chemical degrades-
l2-15 months in temperate climates,
according to the Extension Toxicology
Network, a pesticide information network
archived at Oregon State University).
However, the EPA supported testing of
tebuthiuron in Colombia on the basis of
research conducted by Helling. His work
on glyphosate, tebuthiuron, and hexazi-
none indicates that climate can dramatical-
ly affect the persistence and mobility of
pesticides. "Much of tebuthiuron use in
the United States is in semiarid areas,"
Helling says. "But conditions are different
in the tropics, with high rainfall, high tem-
peratures, and high soil microbial activity.
You get a shorter half-life under such con-
ditions." He adds that tebuthiuron is
already used in the tropics on sugar cane.
Helling's tests took place on illicit coca
plots in Peru and Panama, and on a tropi-
cal U.S. test site chosen for its similar soil
and climate. "The Panama site was selected
particularly as a 'worst-case scenario' [with]
steep hillsides ending at a small stream. I
monitored for erosion and herbicide
residues in water," Helling explains. No
residues ofhexazinone or tebuthiuron were
detected in streams near the Panama and
Peru sites. Glyphosate (applied at the
Panama site) was undetected in water one-
and-a-half months after treatment, and
caused no obvious long-term ecological
shift, Helling wrote in his paper. Natural
vegetation in Peru and Panama regrew
within a few months of treatment with
hexazinone, tebuthiuron, or glyphosate,
while food crops (growing in or near
Peruvian coca fields and treated with hexa-
zinone or tebuthiuron) showed no appar-
ent injury.
It should be noted, says Maria Teresa
Hart, an official at the Embassy of Peru,
that Peru does not apply chemical eradica-
tion methods to drug crops. Says Hart,
"Peru only eradicates manually and only in
natural reserves, for our [drug] policy is not
geared against the farmer but against the
trafficker. That is why our success has been
based in the combination ofinterdiction of
traffickers plus alternative development [for
farmers]." According to Hart, Peru reduced
its area ofcoca fields by 27% in 1997.
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Helling's work forms part of a very
meager body of research on the environ-
mental effects ofchemical drug crop eradi-
cation. There are relatively few studies of
herbicide fate in tropical soils, still fewer
studies of herbicides used or considered
for drug crop eradication, and no substan-
tive studies ofthe environmental effects of
drug production and processing. "In the
real world ofcoca growing, it's very diffi-
cult to collect samples of the type you'd
like, because of logistics and safety,"
Helling says. He has proposed a
U.S.-Colombian study on the effects of
both chemical eradication and processing
of coca, but the study is stalled in
Colombia due to protests as to the safety
oftebuthiuron.
Helling is convinced that properly
applied herbicides can eradicate both coca
and opium poppy crops without major
environmental damage, and points out
that the erosion blamed on coca cultiva-
tion would be a common factor in all cul-
tivated agriculture in the region. "Erosion
is a serious concern with opium produc-
tion," he says. "But the worst problem I've
seen during recent overflights has been
with legitimate agriculture. Overall, the
environmental problem that surpasses ero-
sion seems to me to be the deforestation
caused by the slash-and-burn technique
used to clear land for narcotic crops or
conventional agriculture." Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that persistent eradication
operations may convince some growers to
turn to other crops.
Some groups say that strategies that
focus on eradicating illicit drug crops may
ignore the problems underlying drug crop
cultivation. According to Tate, this is the
case in Colombia, where a focus on aerial
eradication is "keeping Colombia from
looking at the issues behind coca cultiva-
tion-land tenure and political violence."
Critics charge, however, that chemical
eradication has done little to stem the
spread of illicit crops, or to prevent their
processing and ultimate sale in consumer
countries. Despite a tenfold expansion in
antidrug budgets since 1981, production
of opium gum has increased steadily from
2,242 MT in 1987 to 4,137 MT in 1997,
and coca leaf production decreased only
slightly during that period-from 291,100
MT to 263,900 MT, according to the
1997 International Narcotic Control
Strategy Report. In a February 1997 letter
report entitled Drug Control: Long-standing
Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts,
the U.S. General Accounting Office noted
that, despite some successes in eradication
and other initiatives, illegal drugs still flood
the United States.
Winning the DrugWar
Principals in the global drug war are
increasingly heeding long-standing calls by
grassroots organizations to address under-
lying problems that encourage drug use
and production, and to support alternative
development in producer countries. This
past June at a UN General Assembly spe-
cial session on the global drug problem,
leaders from member countries endorsed
supporting alternative development pro-
grams as part ofa global strategy to combat
the production and abuse of illegal drugs.
Peru is one of the drug-producing coun-
tries that has chosen the alternative devel-
opment route. Upon taking office in 1990,
Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori
addressed issues of terrorism and hyperin-
flation, apprehended and jailed the leaders
of the Shining Path movement, and stabi-
lized the country's currency. Peru then
cooperated with the United States in an
initiative to destroy the aerial corridor used
by traffickers to fly illicit coca from
Peruvian fields to processing operations in
Colombia. In 1995 and 1996, the
Peruvian government used equipment and
technical assistance provided by the United
States to force or shoot down approximate-
ly 60 aircraft along this corridor. The effect
of destroying the air bridge was a drop in
the price ofillicit coca and a gradual aban-
donment of the plots. The country has
leveraged $270 million in pledges from
donor countries and allotted $300 million
in Peruvian funds for alternative develop-
ment and infrastructure improvements in
coca zones.
Although alternative development is
certainly an option, questions about the
environmental and human health effects of
chemical eradication ofdrug crops remain.
The small body of scientific evidence sug-
gests that chemical eradication might cause
less environmental damage than cultiva-
tion, but much ofthe argument remains in
the realm of estimates and anecdotes.
Definitive studies on exactly how drug cul-
tivation and chemical eradication affect
human and ecological communities could
serve as an important tool in approaching
the global drug war and its aftermath.
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